Recent Issues in Child Support
- Beth M. Johnson

- May 19
- 7 min read
Net Resources
The purpose of a child-support suit is to obtain an order requiring one or both parents to pay for a child’s financial, medical, and dental support. See Tex. Fam. Code §§ 154.001(a); 154.003, 154.008. To determine the amount of income available for child support, the court must calculate the respondent's net resources. Net resources are calculated by (1) determining the annual sum of all resources defined as “net resources,” (2) subtracting from that amount certain items, such as taxes paid, and (3) dividing the result by 12 to determine monthly net resources. See Tex. Fam. Code § 154.062. To the extent possible, the court must rely on evidence of a party’s resources when applying the child-support guidelines. Tex. Fam. Code § 154.0655(b).
To calculate net resources, the court must determine the sum of all resources available to the obligor on an annual basis. See Tex. Fam. Code § 154.061(a). Generally, the court must base its calculations on some substantive and probative evidence of net resources, but it is not always clear how resources should be calculated on an annual basis. See Reagins v. Walker, 524 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.). Many courts average current and former resources to determine what the obligor’s net resources would be for a year, particularly when the evidence of income is imprecise or incomplete. See e.g., Ayala v. Ayala, 387 S.W.3d 721, 727 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.).
While providing an obligor’s W-2 or income-check stubs would be the most straightforward way of determining net resources, that is not always possible, and creativity is required. See In re K.C., No. 05-24-00806-CV, 2026 WL 188026 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re K.W., No. 04-24-00831-CV, 2025 WL 3157649 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2025, pet. denied) (mem. op.); but see Ly v. Nguyen, No. 03-23-00535-CV, 2025 WL 2677889 (Tex. App.—Austin 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.); No. 02-24-00292-CV, 2025 WL 1909327 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.).
In K.C., the father failed to fully disclose financial information; however, the mother was able to piece together information from the limited CashApp statements the father provided. 2026 WL 188026, at 1. Based on the information provided by the mother, the court ordered maximum guideline support. Id. at 1. The father appealed, asserting the evidence was insufficient to support the finding that his monthly net resources exceeded $9200. Id. at *3. However, under the abuse of discretion standard, the mother’s evidence was sufficient to show that the father had been moving significant sums of money through his CashApp accounts that were likely attributable to income. Id.
In K.W., the parents had the child before the mother was 18 years old. 2025 WL 3157649, at 1. Both parents moved on with different partners, and the father had additional children with his new wife. Id. at 1. The father claimed to only make $2000 monthly, suggested a 50/50 possession schedule, and asked to be ordered to pay $500 a month in child support. Id. However, the record showed that the father owned at least three businesses, paid his wife approximately $5,000 a month for work performed at two of his businesses, and previously received $1,000 per month from his parents for working at their restaurants. Id. at *3. Additionally, his parents covered the $1,300 mortgage payment for his second house, $1,100 car payment, and other bills. Id. Based on this evidence, the appellate court did not abuse its discretion in setting the father’s child support obligation at $800 per month. Id.
In Ly, the father owned a car-repair shop. 2025 WL 2677889, at 1. Although the gross receipts from the business exceeded $150,000 annually, the father reported an income of less than $22,000 to the IRS. Id. at 2. The trial court ordered the father to pay maximum guideline support, and he appealed. Id. The gross receipts offered by the mother were for the first four years of the father’s business and included operations during the beginnings of COVID-19. Id. at 8. The father testified about his expenses and other difficulties faced during that time period. Id. at 8. The mother did not controvert the father’s testimony about expenses. Id. In support of her request for maximum guideline support, the mother further testified that the father earned over $200,000 annually at a job more than 10 years earlier. Id. However, that testimony was speculative and did not account for the costs that could be incurred if the father were to shut down his business to return to his prior job. Id. The evidence was insufficient to support the judgment, but also insufficient to allow the appellate court to set a child support amount. Id. at *9. Thus, the question was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
In Mitchell, the father was much older than the mother. 2025 WL 1909327, at 1. After 40 years of practicing medicine, the father lost his job and did not regain permanent professional employment. Id. The parties divorced about two years later. Id. Although the father was a licensed doctor and licensed attorney, he was unable to find another job. Id. at 2. Although the father reported his recent income was “basically zero,” the father’s monthly expenses were $7670.09, so the trial court determined the father’s monthly net resources equaled his net expenses. Id. at 2, 5. Although there was evidence of the father’s assets, there was no evidence explaining how the father was paying his monthly expenses. Id. at 5–6. The trial court needed to know the source of funding to determine whether it was a net resource. Id. at *6.
Texas Family Code Section 154.062 explicitly defines five resources that the trial court must use in calculating an obligor's net resources: (1) wages and salary; (2) interest, dividends, and royalty income; (3) self-employment income, (4) net rental income, and (5) all other income actually being received. Tex. Fam. Code. Ann. § 154.062(b)(1–5). Unmistakably absent from this list is an obligor's monthly expenses. Id. Expenses are not inherently synonymous with wages, salary, compensation, interest, dividends, or other income received; thus, they should not be employed as a substitute for probative evidence of resources in the calculation of an obligor's net resources.
Id. Because the evidence was insufficient, the appellate court remanded the issue for further proceedings. Id. at *10.
Adult Child Support
A court may order either or both parents to provide for the support of an adult child for an indefinite period if it finds that:
(1) the child, whether institutionalized or not, requires substantial care and personal supervision because of a mental or physical disability and will not be capable of self-support; and
(2) the disability exists, or the cause of the disability is known to exist, on or before the 18th birthday of the child.
Tex. Fam. Code § 154.302(a). The court must designate a parent or other person having physical custody or guardianship under a court order to receive the support for the child. Tex. Fam. Code § 154.302(b).
Whether a child requires substantial care and personal supervision because of a mental or physical disability and will not be capable of self-support is a fact-intensive inquiry that must be addressed on a case-by-case basis. See Nunez v. Nichols, No. 03-24-00263-CV, 2026 WL 1171408, at 3–4 (Tex. App.—Austin 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.); Huskey v. White, No. 14-25-00360-CV, 2026 WL 1345265, at 2–3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). Expert testimony is not required. Nunez, 2026 WL 1171408, at 3–4; Huskey, 2026 WL 1345265, at 2–3. In the absence of evidence to support modification of the amount of child support, the trial court does not err in simply continuing the same child support obligation in place before the child’s 18th birthday. See Huskey, 2026 WL 1345265, at *4.
Enforcements
An obligee can file a motion to enforce child support. In re D.G.R., No. 04-05-00439-CV, 2006 WL 3611156 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.). The obligee is the person or entity entitled to receive child support payments, including an agency of Texas or another jurisdiction to which a person has assigned the person’s right to support. Tex. Fam. Code § 101.021; see Tex. Fam Code § 102.007.
If a motion for enforcement of child support requests a money judgment for arrearages, the court “shall confirm the amount of arrearages and render cumulative money judgments” that include “interest on the child support arrearages.” Tex. Fam. Code § 157.263(a), (b)(3). Paying the support before the hearing does not remove this mandate to render a judgment for interest on accumulated arrearages. In re Z.P., No. 05-25-00607-CV, 2026 WL 815113, at 1–2 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Judgments Nunc Pro Tunc
Judgments nunc pro tunc can be used to correct clerical errors in child support orders after the expiration of plenary power. In re T.C.C., No. 05-24-01177-CV, 2026 WL 826203, at 1 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re S.M.M., No. 05-24-01212-CV, 2026 WL 1309161, at 2 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). Judgments nunc pro tunc cannot be used to change orders if the underlying records do not support the change. S.M.M., 2026 WL 1309161, at 2. In T.C.C., the trial court rendered that guideline support would be applied and put that ruling in a docket entry. 2026 WL 826203, at 1. However, the final order obligated Father to pay an amount less than what guideline support would have been if applied to a presumed minimum wage salary. Id. The appellate court affirmed a judgment nunc pro tunc to correct that error. Id. at 3. Contrarily, in S.M.M., the trial court did not orally rule one way or the other on the mother’s request for attorney’s fees; however, the final judgment included such an award. 2026 WL 1309161, at 3. Neither party appealed, but the trial court granted the father’s motion for judgment nunc pro tunc to delete the attorney’s fee award. Id. at 1. The appellate court held that the removal of the award was a judicial error rather than a clerical one because nothing in the record indicated the trial court denied the fee award. Id. at 2–*4.






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