Enforcement of Divorce Decrees (2026 update)

In the last year, there were quite a few appeals of cases to enforce property divisions. While there were not any fundamental shifts in the law, the courts further refined the existing law, and issued opinions that should serve as reminders for the family-law practitioner.

Courts interpret divorce decree language as they do other judgments. Hagen v. Hagen, 282 S.W.3d 899, 901 (Tex. 2009). “As with other final, unappealed judgments which are regular on their face, divorce decrees and judgments are not vulnerable to collateral attack.” Id. at 902. However, the Family Code authorizes a trial court that rendered a divorce decree to enter orders to enforce or specify more precisely the decree’s property division. See Tex. Fam. Code § 9.006(a) (“[T]he court may render further orders to enforce the division of property made or approved in the decree ... to assist in the implementation of or to clarify the prior order” and “may specify more precisely the manner of effecting the property division previously made if the substantive division of property is not altered or changed.”); Hagen, 282 S.W.3d at 902. If the trial court finds that the original form of the property division is not specific enough to be enforceable by contempt, it “may render a clarifying order setting forth specific terms to enforce compliance with the original division of property.” Tex. Fam. Code § 9.008. But the trial court may not “amend, modify, or change the division of property” originally set out in the decree. Tex. Fam. Code § 9.007(a). “Attempting to obtain an order that alters or modifies a divorce decree's property division is an impermissible collateral attack.” Hagen, 282 S.W.3d at 902.

When a decree explicitly sets out provisions for the sale of a marital residence and the division of net proceeds from that sale, those provisions must be enforced as written. Canady v. Canady, No. 03-24-00318-CV, 2025 WL 1759008, at 2 (Tex. App.—Austin 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.). In Canady, the decree gave the husband 180 days to refinance the mortgage and remove the wife’s name from the note. Id. at 2. If he failed to do so within the 180 days, the decree required that the house be sold. Id. Husband failed to timely refinance. Id. When the wife filed an enforcement to have the house sold pursuant to the decree, the husband sought to assume the mortgage instead of sell the house. Id. However, Husband’s request would have impermissibly modified the property division. Id. at *2.

Adding terms to effectuate a property division does not constitute a modification of that property division. Kozinn v. Kozinn, No. 03-23-00378-CV, 2025 WL 1748191, at 3 (Tex. App.—Austin 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also Fry v. Fry, No. 01-22-00611, 2024 WL 969728 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (clarification that Husband’s company owed Wife money, and Husband was guarantor of moneys owed did not modify decree); LeBlanc v. LeBlanc, 676 S.W.3d 703, 708 (Tex. App.—El Paso, 2023, no pet.) (clarifying execution of documents necessary to refinance mortgage as ordered in decree). In Kozinn, the trial court ordered the husband to sign an amended tax return in order to effectuate the decree’s provision that each party would be responsible for 50% of taxes during the relevant time period and entitled to 50% of any tax refund. 2025 WL 1748191, at 3. Contrary to the husband’s assertion, the enforcement order did not modify the division merely because the amended return was not referenced in the divorce decree. Id.

When interpreting a decree, it must be read as whole so as to harmonize all the provisions of the decree. Stroik v. Stroik, No. 02-24-00322-CV, 2025 WL 1416076. at 5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2025, pet. denied) (mem. op.). In Stroik, the husband argued he was not obligated to turn over real property awarded to the wife in the decree because the award was “subject to” her obligation to refinance the property. Id. However, the husband’s interpretation failed to read the decree as a whole. Id. at 6. The decree awarded the property to the wife immediately and unconditionally. Id. at 9. It required the husband to deliver a special warranty deed to the wife within five days after the decree was signed. Id. at 6. The decree gave the wife significantly more than five days to attempt to refinance the property. Id. at 7. Although the wife was required to refinance the property, that requirement was not a condition precedent to the husband’s obligation to turn over the property to her. Id.

A court may appoint a receiver to effectuate a property division, so long as the receivership order does not modify the division. Miles v. Miles, No. 05-24-00740-CV, 2025 WL 863479, at 6–7 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2025, pet. denied) (mem. op.). In Miles, the court did not abuse its discretion in appointing a receiver; however, the receivership order was remanded because it did not include the decree’s provision requiring a minimum value for the sale of the parties marital residence. Id. at *7. If the receiver could not obtain a sale for that price, then, pursuant to the decree, the receiver was required to seek court approval to sell the home at a lower price. Id.

The two-year statute of limitations imposed by Chapter 9 only applies to “tangible personal property.” Peterson v. Peterson, No. 05-23-01023-CV, 2025 WL 1182591, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.). “Tangible personal property is property that can be seen, weighed, measured, felt, or touched.” Id. (citing Black’s Law Dictionary). Thus, the trial court erred in applying the limitation to a parking space and timeshare. Id. 

A court cannot enforce contractual alimony via a wage withholding order. Aguilar v. Aguilar, No. 04-24-00161-CV, 2025 WL 1512197, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.). “Texas law distinguishes between court-ordered spousal-maintenance awards under Chapter 8 [of the Texas Family Code] and court-approved voluntary obligations under Chapter 7.” Id. (citing Dalton v. Dalton, 551 S.W.3d 126, 131 (Tex. 2018)). The two kinds of obligations differ in how they are created, who is eligible to benefit from them, and how they may be enforced. Id. “A legal obligation to support a spouse [under Chapter 8] is enforceable by contempt, but a promise to pay contractual alimony creates nothing more than a debt.” Id. (citing Kee v. Kee, 307 S.W.3d 812, 815–16 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. denied)). While a wage-withholding order can be used to enforce Chapter 8 maintenance, it cannot be used to enforce contractual alimony. Id.

If delivery of property is no longer an adequate remedy, the court may grant a money judgment. See Buipham v. Nguyen, No. 14-23-00553-CV, 2025 WL 248703, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.). If the value of the undelivered asset was not determined in the divorce proceeding, evidence of value may be presented in the enforcement proceeding. See id.

If a trial court’s order in a Chapter 9 suit modifies the property division, that order would be a reversable abuse of discretion; however, it would not be void for lack of jurisdiction. Morrison v. Morrison, S.W.3d , No. 24-0053, 2026 WL 247877, at 5–6 (Tex. 2026). As discussed above, a decree must be enforced as written. Id. at 4 (citing Hagen, 282 S.W.3d at 901). In Morrison, the parties decree required the trial court to determine any amounts of damages resulting from the breach of the decree and then use proceeds from the sale of the marital residence to remedy the breach. Id. at 1. Because the trial court did not place a value on damages and merely awarded 100% of the proceeds to the wife, the trial court failed to follow the terms of the decree. Id. at *6.

When clarification is necessary, the clarification order cannot hold the respondent in contempt because the respondent would have had no notice of the duties imposed upon him. In re Le, No. 05-25-00019-CV, 2025 WL 3027413, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2025, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).

Even if a corporation is tangentially related to a property division, an enforcement petition that simply seeks to enforce the spouse’s obligations need not join the corporation in the enforcement action. See Perry v. Perry, No. 09-24-00342-CV, 2025 WL 3546579, at 8–9 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.). In Perry, the wife asked the trial court to appoint a receiver to take control of the husband’s share of proceeds from the sale of a corporation. Id. at *9. She did not seek to interfere with the sale or impose any duty on the corporation itself. Id. Thus, the receivership “to take charge and possession of the sale proceeds owed to [Husband] … and distribute half of the proceeds to [Wife]” was affirmed.

When a party appeals a property division, they may seek to supersede the judgment with a bond to delay enforcement until after the appeal. See Curtis v. Laplante, No. 04-24-00801-CV, 2025 WL 2610456, at 2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.). Importantly, the filing of an appeal alone does not pause enforcement. Id. “‘A trial court has an affirmative duty to enforce its judgment,’ and a trial court errs by refusing to enforce a judgment that has not been superseded.” Id. (emphasis added). Under the newly revised Rules of Appellate Procedure, a bond to supersede the judgment is effective upon filing. Id. (citing Tex. R. App. P. 24.1(b)(2)). However, that bond is subject to challenge if the opposing party believes it is insufficient. Id. Upon a challenge, the question to be presented to the trial court is the amount of sufficiency, not the validity of the bond. Id. In Curtis, the husband was allowed to post a bond to supersede the judgment; however, because the wife challenged its sufficiency, the trial court was ordered to conduct a hearing. Id. at 3. If, after hearing evidence, the court found an additional bond amount was required and if the husband failed to file a sufficient bond by the deadline, any stay of enforcement would be lifted. Id.

Again, it is important to remember—and to help your clients understand—Chapter 9 enforcements are used to enforce the decree as rendered, not to relitigate the divorce. The family courts can aid with the enforcement, but their power is limited.